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Against the backdrop of the war and revolution in Ukraine, and Russia’s 
seeming return to the Cold War mentality and confrontation with the West, 
the Baltic states look increasingly “normal” among the states of the former 
Soviet Union. Apart from the long-established Western fear of instability 
resulting from the Russian minority issue,1 Baltic anxieties about the Rus-
sian military power and intentions, international press has not had much 
sensational to report about the Baltic states in recent years. Their politi-
cal development seems to be following the trajectory of long-consolidated 
European democracies. Indeed, their twenty-five-year path from Soviet 
republics to EU member states looks even more spectacular after the recent 
rise of concerns over democracy in Hungary and Poland – countries long 
considered the exemplary democratic transition states of the former War-
saw Pact along with Czechoslovakia, all of which had a much better initial 
starting position in terms of political-economic reform compared to the 
former Soviet republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the early 1990s.2
1  With a potential of triggering international crises and even a nuclear third world war 
in popular imagination as evocatively suggested in the footage of a major war game 
World War Three: inside the War Room (BBC Two, 2016).
2  Among the twenty nine post-communist nations, in 2016 Estonia ranked first in 
democratic development, Latvia third and Lithuania ranked fifth, according to Free-
dom House, a US-based human rights organization, <http://estonianworld.com/busi-
ness/estonia-ranks-first-freedom-house-democratic-development-index/> (accessed 
30 October 2016).
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The renewed interest in “why the Baltic states are not Balkans?”3 there-
fore seems well-warranted. In order to reconsider the long-term develop-
ment of the Baltic states in the twentieth century, this special issue invokes 
the concept of “critical juncture” from social sciences. Following Giovanni 
Capoccia and Daniel Kelemen (2007), critical juncture is a relatively rare 
occasion, a “window of opportunity”, a situation when structural con-
straints relax, the pace of events increases rapidly, and political actors face 
a multitude of choices to remodel existing institutions. The importance and 
the nature of a critical juncture can only be understood against the back-
drop of longer periods of institutional development, during which the role 
of contingency and the extent of reform are far more modest. The choices 
that powerful actors make during those periods of rupture are likely to 
persist, as they tend to generate “path-dependent processes” that determine 
the nature of institutions over a longer period of time. In their book Why 
nations fail, Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson trace the impact of criti-
cal junctures on economic and political institutions around the globe. One 
such example is the descent of the bubonic plague on medieval Europe and 
the diverging of economic developments in Western and Eastern Europe, 
with the former experiencing the rise of worker’s wages and extension of 
individual rights and the latter seeing the consolidation of serfdom and 
extractive economic institutions.4 Although the concept is elusive, des-
tined to generate debates over which events should be given the mantle of 
a critical juncture, it is a useful tool to rethink long-term historical trends 
and particularly the consequences of short-term revolutionary changes. 
In this issue we pause on two critical junctures in the Baltic history, the 
aftermath of the First World War, and the end of the Cold War. The First 
World War resulted in the collapse of the Russian Empire, giving Germany 
the opportunity to extend its sphere of influence, its political and military 
power into the Baltic provinces. As a consequence sovereignty over Bal-
tic peoples, subjects of the Russian Czars since 1721, suddenly became an 
object of discussion, diplomatic negotiation and military struggle. In con-
trast to earlier periods when the “Baltic question” had also been fought out 
between greater nations, this time Baltic political nationalism, a new and 
unanticipated force, was also thrown into the scales and indeed played a 
major role in the outcome – the creation of three new states, Estonia, Latvia 
3  Walter C. Clemens, “Ethnic peace, ethnic conflict: complexity theory on why the 
Baltic is not the Balkans”, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 43:3 (2010), 245–261. 
4  Daron Acemoglu, James Robinson, Why nations fail: the origins of power, prosperity, 
and poverty (London: Profile Books, 2013).
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and Lithuania. Therefore, as we use the term “Baltic question” that implies 
an outsider’s or even an imperial perspective,5 we should not forget that 
the Baltic nations were also important players in the game, at least in the 
twentieth century. The penultimate and last article of the issue (Stöcker, 
and Piirimäe/Grönholm) highlight this point in their respective examina-
tions of the role of the “internal” actors in solving the Baltic puzzle after 
the Cold War.
The other critical juncture under scrutiny relates to the final years of the 
Cold War. As in the First World War, the independence of Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania was not part of the plan of any of the great powers negoti-
ating a new international system. Just as the First World War had ended 
without the future of the Baltic states having been settled, the Cold War 
came to a close leaving the Baltic states in a similar situation. According to 
the majority view the Cold War ended in 1989–90 with the collapse of the 
Warsaw Pact and the reunification of Germany, while no major structural 
changes were initially sought in the Soviet Union.6 The Baltic struggle for 
independence, even though it had manifested itself earlier (1988) and more 
vocally than popular movements in the Eastern bloc, was largely ignored 
and later misrepresented in the chronological frames of the end of the Cold 
War. Indeed, Western governments needed a stable partner in the East to 
negotiate agreements on arms reduction, departure of Soviet troops from 
Europe, and other Cold War legacies, as well as in solving new conflicts, 
such as the Gulf Crisis, to usher in a new era in world politics. All these 
factors postponed decisions on the “Baltic question” and produced a highly 
volatile and precarious situation in the Baltic states thereof. Explicating 
the role of the United States (Olavi Arens), France (Una Bergmane and 
Louis Clerc), Iceland (Guðni Jóhannesson) and Sweden (Mart Kuldkepp) 
5  Authors are grateful to Laur Vallikivi of the University of Tartu for turning attention 
to those connotations of the term “Baltic question”. 
6  For a good discussion of various perspectives on the multiple “endings” of the Cold 
War as an international system, see Reinterpreting the end of the Cold War: issues, 
interpretations, periodizations, ed. by Silvio Pons and Federico Romero (Abingdon & 
New York: Frank Cass & Routledge, 2005), especially chapters by Odd Arne Westad 
(“Beginnings of the end: how the Cold War crumbled”, 68–81), and Jonathan Haslam 
(“1989: history is rewritten”, 165–178). See also Norman A. Graebner, Richard Dean Burns, 
Joseph M. Siracusa, Reagan, Bush, Gorbachev: revisiting the end of the Cold War (London: 
Praeger Security International, 2008); Stephen Kotkin, Armageddon averted: the Soviet 
collapse, 1970–2000 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); John Prados, How the 
Cold War ended: debating and doing history (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2011); 
Vladislav Zubok, “‘Why did the Cold War end in 1989? Explanations of “The Turn”’, 
Reviewing the Cold War: approaches, interpretations, theory, ed. by Odd Arne Westad 
(London: Frank Cass, 2000), 343–368.
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in the process of the Baltic emancipation and the eventual happy end (i.e. 
the restoration of their independent statehood) in August 1991 is the sub-
ject of this special issue.
The first four articles of this issue look at the Baltic independence strug-
gle through the lens of the “Baltic question”, a concept that obviously needs 
some theoretical clarification. According to Walter Kirchner, probably the 
first author to academically analysz it, the phenomenon refers to “the role 
which the eastern Baltic region played in world affairs”, “the influence 
which this area exercised upon the development of the surrounding great 
powers”, consisting of a “conflict of interests in the power politics of great 
nations”.7 Kirchner’s interpretation of the Baltic question as an issue affect-
ing “world affairs”, and world affairs affecting the Baltic states, is still rele-
vant. However, the nature of that influence should be defined more broadly. 
Whereas Kirchner focused narrowly on issues of strategy and high poli-
tics, this volume takes advantage of the developments in the discipline of 
international history (Kirchner’s study appeared in 1954) and re-interpreta-
tions of the Baltic question that have appeared since the 2000s in particu-
lar. In his work dedicated to France’s diplomacy towards the Nordic states 
and especialy Finland, Louis Clerc considered geopolitical incentives but 
emphasized also subtler forces at play in shaping these relations – from the 
abstraction of representations and culture to the materiality of personal 
networks.8 It furthermore resonates with the powerful call of the “postco-
lonial security studies” to investigate “the weak and the strong together, as 
jointly responsible for making history” and shaping world politics.9 It also 
takes a cue from Kaarel Piirimäe’s monograph Roosevelt, Churchill and the 
Baltic question which has inter alia scrutinized the impact of intellectual 
history and the development of political ideas on the handling of the Bal-
tic states by the Big Three in the Second World War.10 Una Bergmane has 
dwelled on another layer that has become increasingly important in inter-
national politics in the wake of globalization and information revolution, 
7  Walter Kirchner, The rise of the Baltic question (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1954), 
2, 254–257. 
8  Louis Clerc, La Finlande et l’Europe du Nord dans la diplomatie française: relations 
bilaterales et intérêt national dans les considérations finlandaises et nordiques des diplo-
mates et militaires français, 1917–1940 (Bruxelles: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2011).
9  Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, “The postcolonial moment in security studies”, Review 
of International Studies, 32:2 (2006), 329–352, 333.
10  Kaarel Piirimäe, Roosevelt, Churchill and the Baltic question: allied relations during 
the Second World War (New York: Palgrave, 2014).
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and namely public diplomacy.11 Most probably there will never be a sin-
gular definiation of public diplomacy, as it depends on historic traditions, 
cultural practices and other factors, but at its core, as defined by Edmund 
Gullion in the 1960s, public diplomacy deals with the “influence of public 
attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies”.12 The crux 
of the matter is that whereas Ivan the Terrible or Sigismund August, the 
key players in Kirchner’s analysis of the sixteenth-century Europe, could 
ignore the opinion of their own people or the Livonians they were going 
to conquer, public opinion has been an increasingly important factor in 
the twentieth-century foreign policy-making processes.13 
This volume has thus broadened the scope of Kirchner’s original analysis 
regarding “the Baltic question” and discusses not only strategic concerns 
of the countries involved, but considers also other factors affecting policy-
making, such as cultural perceptions of foreign policy-making elites; the 
effectiveness of the networks of activists advancing the Baltic cause; the 
shifting meaning of political concepts (i.e. national self-determination in 
Arens’ chapter); the changing international rules and norms; institutional 
frameworks in which foreign policy is formulated (bureaucracy, key indi-
viduals etc.); and domestic politics. As such, it engages with a panoply of 
topics that the sub-discipline of Foreign Policy Analysis, straddling Polit-
ical Science/International Relations and International History has dealt 
with in extensive detail in recent decades. The papers address the complex 
interchanges between the domestic and the international, exploring the 
processing of “the Baltic question” on multiple levels of analysis (ranging 
from international systemic to state, sub-state, and ultimately, the indi-
vidual) by different actors (governments and their bureaucracies, domes-
tic and transnational social groups, individual politicians) and conceptual 
11  Una Bergmane, French and US reactions facing the disintegration of the USSR: the case 
of the Baltic states (1989–1991), Sciences Po, Paris, unpublished PhD Thesis; Una Berg-
mane, “Diplomacy and diasporas, self-perceptions and representations: Baltic attempts 
to promote independence, 1989–1991”, Histories of public diplomacy and nation branding 
in the Nordic and Baltic countries: representing the periphery, ed. by Louis Clerc, Nikolas 
Glover, Paul Jordan (Leiden: Brill/Nijhoff, 2015), 195–216.
12  James Pamment, New public diplomacy in the 21st century: a comparative study of 
policy and practice (New York: Routledge, 2012), 6; Histories of public diplomacy and 
nation branding.
13  See, e.g., Douglas Foyle, “Public opinion and foreign policy: elite beliefs as a mediat-
ing variable”, International Studies Quarterly, 41:1 (1997), 141–170, and “Foreign policy 
analysis and globalization: public opinion, world opinion and the individual”, Interna-
tional Studies Review, 5:2 (2003), 155–202; Ole Holsti, “Public opinion and foreign policy: 
the challenge to the Almond-Lippmann consensus”, International Studies Quarterly, 
36:4 (1992), 439–466.
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models explaining their respective decisions and actions in policy formu-
lation and implementation.14
Moreover, Arens, Bergmane, Clerc and Kuldkepp take a uniquely long-
term view by comparing the policies of the governments under scrutiny in 
two time periods, in 1918–22 and 1988–91. The comparative analysis allows 
them to approach the following questions: 
1.  What are the similarities and differences in the opportunities and chal-
lenges presented by the “Baltic question” for the countries concerned in 
1918–22 and 1988–91?
2.  What are the similarities and differences in the position of USA/France/
Sweden in world affairs and in the Baltic region in 1918–22 and 1988–91?
3.  To what extent had the international context (including the global norms, 
domestic political contexts, and globalization) changed by the 1980s?
These issues are raised with a quest for an improved understanding of the 
international contexts of the Baltic struggle for independence at the criti-
cal junctures in the history of the twentieth century. At a more conceptual 
level, we are interested in the role of foreign support or the lack thereof in 
shaping the political outcome in the eastern Baltic region. What kind of 
shifts in the international system can be historically pinpointed as deter-
mining the rise of the Baltic question as an important problem in world 
affairs? The latter aspect is essential for policy-makers interested in predic-
tions and in precluding certain negative scenarios (like those that unfolded 
in the Second World War) from materializing for the Baltic states. Last but 
not least, the experience of the Baltic states might be relevant for other 
small states, the destinies of which are affected, among other factors, by 
the unchanging determinant of geography.15 
14  For the background of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) as an analytic field, see Val-
erie Hudson, Foreign policy analysis: classic and contemporary theory (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2014). Using history as a tool in the Baltic foreign policy making 
specifically, see Philippe Perchoc, “History as a tool for foreign policies in the Baltic 
states after 1991”, History, memory and politics in Central, East and South East Europe, 
ed. by G. Mink and L. Neumayer (New York: Palgrave, 2013), 242–266.
15  See Mouritzen’s discussion of the primacy of states’ salient environments over the 
structure of international systems, Hans Mouritzen, “Focus and axioms”, Bordering 
Russia: theory and prospects for Europe’s Baltic rim, ed. by Hans Mouritzen (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 1998), 1–13. The literature on small states in international politics is too large 
to do justice here, but see, e.g., Christine Ingebritsen et al., Small states in international 
relations (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006); Olav F. Knudsen, “Small states, 
latent and extant: towards a general perspective”, Journal of International Relations 
and Development, 5:2 (2002), 182–198; Miriam Fendius Elman, “The foreign policies of 
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The aspect of geography leads us inevitably to the elephant in the room, 
namely Russia, the most important factor in the Baltic history during the 
twentieth century.16 This special issue does not include analyses of the 
Russian or Soviet policies per se. However, the chapters by Lars Fredrik 
Stöcker and Kaarel Piirimäe/Pertti Grönholm deal with the influence of 
Russian/Soviet traditions in Baltic societies and the strength of the coun-
tervailing Western forces. Stöcker scrutinizes the reception of Western 
economic ideas and models of management in Estonia before the start of 
economic perestroika by Mikhail Gorbachev gave economists and entre-
preneurs the opportunity to put those ideas into practice. From the per-
spective of the theory of critical junctures, it could be suggested that the 
Baltic states’ proximity to the West and to Nordic influences (particularly 
in the case of Estonia) created preconditions for the speedy and successful 
transfer of Western economic institutions in the area. Meanwhile, a major 
political change – that is, Gorbachev’s relaxation of central controls, pre-
sented a window of opportunity. The relatively small differences between 
the Baltic republics and the other Soviet republics during the Soviet period 
were therefore translated into different paths of development in Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania on the one hand and Russia, Ukraine and the other 
former republics on the other. Whether the effect is similar to the impact 
of the bubonic plague that led to divergent economic practices in Western 
and Eastern Europe is certainly too early to tell. As only twenty five years 
have passed since the collapse of the Soviet Union, it is hard to predict 
to what extent the developments we have witnessed in the former Soviet 
Union are really path dependent and irreversible, as for example Ukraine 
is again making an effort of fighting corruption and introducing West-
ern practices, while the Baltic states still face structural problems that are 
rooted in the Soviet past.17
The differences between the former Soviet republics that have magni-
fied since 1991 lead one to consider the importance of not only the Soviet 
small states: challenging neorealism in its own backyard”, British Journal of Political 
Science, 25:2 (1995), 171–217. 
16  For the 1990s, see Mouritzen, Bordering Russia, 1. Similar conclusion is drawn for 
the 16th century by Kirchner in Rise, 254.
17  For Ukraine, see Serhiy Kudelia, “Corruption in Ukraine: Perpetuum mobile or the 
endplay of post-Soviet elites?”, Beyond the Euromaidan: comparative perspectives on 
advancing reform in Ukraine, ed. by Henry E. Hale, Robert Orttung (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2016), 61–79; on the Baltic states, see a discussion about post-Soviet 
corruption in Daunis Auers, Comparative politics and government of the Baltic states: 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the 21st century (Basingstoke; New York, NY: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2015), 136–141. 
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period but also of earlier developments since the First World War, which 
can be conceptualized, borrowing from Reinhart Koselleck, as cumula-
tive historical experiences of people involved in critical situations. Expe-
riences shape horizons of expectation that influence the way people act.18 
Kaarel Piirimäe and Pertti Grönholm’s article scrutinizes the impact that 
the experience of and the views on the pre-war society of independent 
Estonia (1918–40) had on people’s outlook in the 1980s and the early 1990s. 
The forty years of forced Soviet rule should have formed a common Soviet 
identity, at least according to the official ideology, but nothing of the sort 
actually happened.19 By comparing the views and ideas of the key players 
in Estonian foreign policy in 1990–91, Piirimäe and Grönholm come to 
the conclusion that the self-identification of the generation born before 
Second World War was strongly attached to the pre-war republic. As a 
result, the older generation was more likely to reject Soviet traditions and 
reinstitute pre-war but also Western practices, whereas the post-war gen-
eration had often the mentality that the Soviet system could be reformed. 
The pre-war generation formed a natural coalition with younger people 
in their twenties and early thirties. The living memory of the “golden age” 
of independence – something that was lacking in other Soviet republics 
beside Bessarabia and Bukovina (Western Belarus and Western Ukraine 
had been part of pre-war Poland and the experiences were somewhat dif-
ferent) – was therefore a key asset in the Baltic states’ quest to return to 
Europe. It contributed to their seemingly smooth transfer from Commu-
nism to post-Communism.
We can, therefore, conclude on an optimistic note. Studying the rise 
of the Baltic question in earlier times, Walter Kirchner observed: “Of all 
concerned, only the Livonians themselves failed to influence the outcome 
of the struggle over the Baltic Question which affected their own land so 
vitally. The sixteenth-century chapter of the Baltic Question had to be 
solved without their contribution.”20 From the vantage point of the 1950, 
he further added that “they remain the unfortunate victims of shifting and 
powerful forces utterly beyond their own control”. In contrast, as this vol-
ume demonstrates, the experience of the First World War and the end of 
18  Reinhart Koselleck, Futures past: on the semantics of historical time; translated and 
with an introduction by Keith Tribe (New York; Chichester: Columbia University Press, 
2004), 259–75.
19  On the possibility of non-Soviet life styles, see Ainė Ramonaitė, “Creating one’s own 
reality as resistance: the shape of ‘parallel society’ in Soviet Lithuania”, Lithuanian 
Historical Studies, 15 (2010), 79–106.
20  Kirchner, Rise, 254.
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the Cold War, along with the developments since the 1990s could serve as 
an illustration of the considerably more active and consequential role of 
Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians in shaping their own fates in inter-
national affairs. This could perhaps provide some comfort in contempo-
rary times of distress when “the Baltic question” is making headlines in 
“high international politics” yet again. While the credibility of the Baltic 
commitment to the North Atlantic alliance and NATO’s commitment to 
the Baltic defence in turn has been openly questioned by the by the cur-
rent President-elect of the United States Donald Trump,21 we might stand 
on the verge of yet another critical juncture in the global handling of “the 
Baltic question”. Regardless of the constraints emphasized by much of 
International Relations theory, generally skeptical of small states’ scope 
of action in difficult geopolitical environments, the historical record of 
the Baltic self-determination in twentieth-century international relations 
comes across as an inspiring example.
21  See <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/07/21/donald-
trump-cast-doubt-on-the-baltics-involvement-in-nato-heres-what-they-actually-do/> 
(accessed 20 October 2016).

